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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-EFFECT OF AFFIRMADEAU'OIORIZATION Vol'E UPON EXISTING UNION-SHOP CoNTRACT-One
month after the employer and the union entered into a two-year contract containing a union-shop provision, a group of employees filed a petition under section 9(e)(l) of the NLRA as amended in 1951 seeking an election to rescind the
union's authority to make a union-shop agreement. The union argued (1) that
the contract was a bar to the election and (2) that even if an immediate election
was ordered and an affirmative deauthorization vote cast, the existing union-shop
clause should be held effective during the remainder of the contract term. The
Board ruled, 3/2, that section 9(e)(l) as amended in 1951 specifically contemplated immediate union-shop deauthorization elections and therefore normal
contract bar principles did not apply, and further that if an affirmative deauthorization vote was cast, the union-shop clause would be immediately rescinded.
Members Murdock and Styles dissented. Great Atlantic and Pacipc Tea Co.,
100 N.L.R.B. No. 251 (1952).
One purpose of the 1951 Taft-Humphrey amendments to the NLRA1 was
to eliminate the requirement that a union-shop clause in a collective bargaining
TIVE

1

65 Stat. L. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§158, 159.
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agreement must be authorized by a majority vote of the employees in a Boardconducted election, a requirement that had proved to be administratively burdensome and unnecessary. 2 This was accomplished by the excision of former section
9(e)(l) and appropriate changes in the wording of section 8(a)(3), leaving
former 9(e)(2) 3 to safeguard the employees by permitting a vote to rescind the
union's authority to make a union-shop agreement. In ruling that this right to
rescind the union's authority to make a union-shop agreement included the right
to rescind an already existing union-shop clause, the majority of the Board justified its position by a resort to legislative history. Setting to one side the question
whether the canons of statutory interpretation justify a resort to legislative history in the face of an apparently plain meaning, 4 an examination of the meager
legislative history of this aspect of the Taft-Humphrey amendments discloses no
clear mandate for the majority position.5 Perhaps the most accurate conclusion
that can be drawn from the congressional records and reports is that the precise
problem of the principal case did not receive congressional attention. 6 A search
of Board decisions as to the effect of deauthorization elections upon existing
contracts prior to the 1951 amendments is equally unrewarding. 7 Abandoning
speculation as to congressional intent, it is submitted that both the majority and
minority constructions of the statutory provision have unfortunate practical
consequences. Under the LMRA and its judicial and quasi-judicial gloss, even
a valid union-shop clause does not bestow upon the union any disciplinary pow2 97 CoNG. REc. 12855 (1951). Over 90% of the many thousands of elections conducted resulted in union-shop authorization. N.L.R.B., 14th ANNuAL REPORT, p. 6 et seq.
(1950); N.L.R.B., 15th ANNuAL REPORT, p. 14 (1951).
3 Renumbered as section 9(e)(l), the section reads "Upon the filing with the Board,
by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a bargaining unit C011ered by an agreement
bettveen their employer and a labor organization made pursuant to section 8(a)(3), of a petition alleging they desire that such authority be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret
ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the results thereof to such labor organization
and to the employer.'' 65 Stat. L. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §159. Emphasis supplied.
4 Both the majority and minority opinions wrestled with this question, but limitations
of space do not permit an exploration of the issue.
5The majority quoted from H. Rep. No. 1082, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1951):
" ••. the bill continues to safeguard employees against subjection to union-shop agreements
which a majority disapproves••• .'' The next sentence of the House Report reads: "To
accomplish this it is provided that the Board shall conduct elections on the petition of 30
percent or more of the employees in a bargaining unit to determine whether the union's
authority to enter into a union-shop arrangement shall be rescinded.'' (Emphasis supplied).
Reading the sentences together, it would seem that the minority of the Board was justified
in charging the majority with quoting out of context.
6 Debate attending the passage of the bill, 97 CoNG, REc. 10463-10465, 12859-12863
(1951), throws no additional light upon the question.
'
7 Research discloses no cases expressly dealing with the application of contract bar
principles, normally applicable to decertification proceedings, to the question of deauthorization elections. Although the Board has ruled that an existing contract did not prevent a
union shop authorization election, Utah Wholesale Grocery Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1948),
unless the contract expressly prevents further negotiation during its term, Brunswig Drug
Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 451 (1951), the deauthorization question would seem to raise different
problems.
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ers over the rank and file members; 8 the sole value to the union of a union-shop
clause is as a compulsory dues-collecting device. 9 Union security, in effect, means
financial security. Under these circumstances, the majority ruling that the union,
after undertaking certain contractual obligations which may involve considerable
expense (such as the handling of grievances), should be subjected at any time to
the possibility of an election which will cut off, to a large extent, its financial
resources is indeed questionable. 10 And further, by subjecting the union's financial sinews to the whim of a shifting majority, the Board ruling would seem to
militate against responsible labor relations by forcing the union to cater to the
demands of the rank and file, however unjust and irresponsible these demands
may be.11 Moreover, it is difficult to justify these consequences in the name of
protecting the members from oppression. To employ political analogy,12 is it
arguable that members of a social compact should be able, during the life of that
compact, to express their dissatisfaction with their leaders not by changing the
leadership, but rather by refusing to pay taxes? On the other hand, a literal
reading of the statute, as advocated by the minority, raises competing considerations. Since the statutory provision by its terms does not permit the Board to
conduct an election until a union-shop agreement has been made,13 the application of contract bar principles would permit the union to enjoy at least one
union-shop clause during the life of the contract whether the members consent
or not.14 As section 9(e)(l) now stands, it is submitted, neither interpretation
8 Kingston Cake Co., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1445 (1952) (union cannot request discharge
of employee where expulsion from union due to his refusal to sign non-Communist affidavit);
Pen and Pencil Workers Union, 91 N.L.R.B. 883 (1950), Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950) (union cannot request discharge of employee for failure to pay fines
for violation of union rules); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 522 (1951) (union
cannot request discharge of employee for dual unionism).
9 So long as the employee tenders his initiation fee and pays his regular dues promptly,
he need not even join the union formally, Union Starch and Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
779 (1949).
10 It might be fairer to the union under the ruling in the principal case to set aside
the entire contract if an affirmative deauthorization vote was cast. See the argument of the
Board minority.
11 It is recognized that these arguments shade over into the larger issue whether the
LMRA approach to union democracy and the protection of individual employees is valid.
For criticisms suggesting that weakening the unions is not the best solution see Cox,
"Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947," 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 274
at 291-299 (1948); Sugerman, "The Rights of the Individual Employee under the TaftHartley Act," THIRD ANNuAL N.Y.U. CoNFERENCE ON LABOR 355 (1950); Witney,
"Union Security,'' 4 LAB. L.J. 105 (1953). For an analysis of possible direct approaches
to the problem, see Summers, "Union Powers and Workers' Rights,'' 49 MrcH. L. R.Ev.
805 (1951).
12 But see Petro, "External Significance of Internal Union Affairs," FotmTH ANmrAL
N.Y.U. CoNFERENCE ON LABOR 339 at 354 (1951), for a forceful argument that unions
should not be accorded the privileges of government, such as compulsory dues payment
analogous to the governmental taxing power.
13 See text of §9(e)(l), note 3 supra.
14 The recent Board decision that a 5-year contract is of reasonable duration and will
therefore act as a bar so long as 5-year contracts obtain in a "substantial part of the industry"
adds point to this consideration. General Motors Corp., Detroit Transmission Div., 102
N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1953).
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can render it entirely satisfactory. A suggested solution is to amend section 9
so as to provide for an optional authorization election prior to contract negotiations, at the request of 30 per cent of the membership, leaving section 9(e)(I)'s
provision for a deauthorization election as a supplementary safeguard by which
union opinion can be canvassed shortly before the expiration of the old contract
and the renewal of collective bargaining.

Richard D. Rohr, S.Ed.

